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Abstract
We study the eﬀect of services trade restrictiveness on manufacturing productivity for a broad cross-
section of countries at diﬀerent stages of economic development. Decreasing services trade restrictiveness
has a positive indirect impact on the manufacturing sectors that use services as intermediate inputs
in production. We identify a critical role of local institutions in shaping this eﬀect: countries with high
institutional capacity beneﬁt the most from services trade policy reforms in terms of increased productivity
in downstream industries. We argue that this reﬂects the characteristics of many services and services
trade and provide a theoretical framework to formalize our suggested mechanisms.
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1 Introduction
Increasing productivity is an essential ingredient of economic growth and development. A large fraction of
such growth originates in the manufacturing sector (Van Ark et al., 2008). The productivity of manufacturing
depends, among others, on the availability of high-quality inputs (Jones, 2011). These include machinery
and intermediate parts and components, as well as a range of services inputs. Figure 1 shows the degree to
which 18 two-digit ISIC manufacturing sectors in the US are dependent on four service industries (transport,
telecommunications, ﬁnance and business services). The average input intensity of these services is around
10%, with a peak of 25% in sector 26 (‘Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products’).1
Trade is an important channel through which ﬁrms can improve their access to inputs, either in the
form of lowering prices or increasing the variety of products that are available (see for instance Topalova
and Khandelwal, 2011). Therefore, the extent to which policies restrict foreign access to upstream services
markets is relevant for downstream productivity. The eﬀect of reforms targetting services industries on
the performance of manufacturing has been tested empirically in a number of recent studies. Both studies
using ﬁrm-level data2 and studies using sector-level data3 generally ﬁnd an economically signiﬁcant impact
of services productivity (or ﬁrms’ access to services) on productivity in manufacturing.4
While this literature has established the importance of the indirect linkage between services trade policy
and economic performance of industries that are downstream in the relevant supply chain, less has been
done to account for the speciﬁc characteristics of services production and exchange in shaping this causal
relationship. The main contribution of this paper is to identify the role that economic institutions play
as a determinant of the size of this indirect eﬀect. Speciﬁcally, we estimate the impact of services trade
restrictiveness on manufacturing productivity and demonstrate that the quality of institutions shapes the
relationship between upstream services openness and downstream manufacturing productivity. We argue
1Figure 1 is constructed using the share of intermediate consumption as measure of input intensity. Section 3 provides more
detail on the construction of this measure.
2See for example Arnold et al., 2008 (10 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa); Fernandes and Paunov, 2011 (Chilean data with
a focus on inward FDI in services); Arnold et al., 2011 (data for the Czech Republic, also with a focus on services FDI); Forlani,
2012 (French data); Duggan et al., 2013 (Indonesian data with a focus on FDI regulations); Hoekman and Shepherd, forthcoming
(119 developing countries); and Arnold et al., forthcoming (Indian data).
3Sector-level empirical studies in this literature include Barone and Cingano, 2011 (17 OECD economies in 1996); Bourle`s et
al., 2013 (15 developed economies during the period 1984-2007); Hoekman and Shepherd, forthcoming (gravity-based analysis
of the impact of services trade openness on manufactured exports).
4Of course, the link between upstream and downstream performance is not limited to services. Blonigen (forthcoming) is
a recent cross-country analysis of the impact of upstream policies in a non-services sector (the steel industry) on downstream
economic outcomes.
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that this is a reﬂection of the characteristics of services and services trade, which often require a foreign ﬁrm
to invest or otherwise establish a physical presence in an importing market to sell services. To provide a
conceptual framework to help understand our empirical ﬁndings we also develop a simple theoretical model.
This embodies key characteristics of services and services trade and identiﬁes why one should expect the
observed moderating eﬀect of institutions.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 motivates our analysis and brieﬂy relates our approach
to some of the literature. Section 3 turns to the econometric exercise, and presents the database, our
speciﬁcations and the estimation results. In section 4 we develop a simple theoretical framework to rationalise
the empirical ﬁnding that institutional capacity is a determinant of the magnitude of the positive eﬀect of
services trade openness on productivity in downstream industries. Section 5 concludes.
Figure 1: Services input pernetration in manufacturing
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2 Motivation and Related Literature
Economic institutions and associated measures of the quality of economic governance such as control of
corruption, rule of law, regulatory quality, contract enforcement, and more generally the investment and
business climate are crucial determinants of economic development.5 In the services literature, some studies
introduce institutional quality as a determinant of the services trade policy stance (van der Marel, 2014a) and
of the coverage of services policy commitments made in trade agreements (van der Marel and Miroudot, 2014).
Building on the literature that identiﬁes institutions as a trigger for comparative advantage in industries
that are more sensitive to the institutional environment (notably complex industries with contract-intensive
production processes),6 van der Marel (2014b) argues that the ability of countries to provide complementary
domestic regulatory policies accompanying services liberalization is a source of comparative advantage in
downstream goods trade.
Institutional quality diﬀers widely across countries. To provide an illustration, Figure 2 shows the
global distribution of the variable ‘control of corruption’ reported in the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance
Indicators dataset.7 A similar pattern of heterogeneous performance applies for a host of business environment
and economic governance indicators. Institutional heterogeneity not only is a direct driver of cross-country
income diﬀerences, it conditions the beneﬁts from economic reforms such as trade liberalization (Rodriguez
and Rodrik, 2014; Winters and Masters, 2013). This conditioning role is also likely to apply in the case
of services policies and policy reforms in terms of impacts on downstream industries. Indeed, this can be
expected to be particularly important for services given that they often are intangible and non-storable. The
former often motivates regulation of services providers, while the latter gives rise to a proximity burden, in
that the agent performing the service must be in the same location as the buyer or consumer.8 Accordingly,
exporters of services often must perform some stages of their economic activity in the importing country,
where they will be subject to local regulation and aﬀected by the quality of prevailing institutions.9
5See, among others, Acemoglu et al. (2001; 2004) and Rodrik et al. (2004). In the trade literature, a number of studies have
looked at institutions as determinants of bilateral trade ﬂows as well as oﬀshoring and FDI decisions at the ﬁrm level. Anderson
and Marcouiller (2002) build a gravity framework where imports depend on the institutional settings aﬀecting the security of
trade and show that weak institutions limit trade as much as tariﬀs do. Other topics in the institutions and trade literature are
the eﬀect of trade outcomes and policies on (endogenous) institutions and the role of informal institutions as social capital and
trust. For a general review of the literature we address the reader to WTO (2013).
6See Nunn (2007); Levchenko (2007); Costinot (2009).
7The variable ranges from 2.41 (best performer) to -1.61 (worst performer).
8See Parry et al. (2011) for a detailed discussion of the characteristics of services.
9The proximity burden is reﬂected in the broad deﬁnition of trade in services used in the WTO General Agreement on
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Figure 2: Control of corruption across the world
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Figure 3 presents some preliminary evidence in support of the conjecture that the quality of institutions
conditions the eﬀects of services trade policy on downstream industries. We plot productivity in manufac-
turing sectors (vertical axis) on a measure of services trade restrictiveness that takes into account the depth
of input-output linkages between a given upstream service sector and a given downstream manufacturing
sector (CSTRI, on the horizontal axis).10 In the ﬁgure, light dots are manufacturing sectors in countries
lying above the sample median of the variable ‘control of corruption’ (the main proxy for institutional quality
that we will use in this paper); dark dots are manufacturing sectors in countries lying below this sample
median. In the case of countries with high institutional quality, the regression line is negatively sloped, with
a statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of -0.112. Conversely, for countries with low institutional quality the slope
of the regression line is not statistically diﬀerent from zero. These data suggest that institutional quality is
a determinant of the potential gains from services trade liberalization.
We can think of two broad mechanisms through which institutions may condition the downstream eﬀects
of upstream services trade policy, given a presumption foreign ﬁrms must establish some degree of commercial
Trade in Services (GATS), which includes sales of services through modes 3 (‘commercial presence’) and 4 (‘presence of natural
persons’). According to WTO estimates, modes 3 and 4 command a total share of 60% (respectively, 55% and 5%) of world
exports of services. Mode 1 (cross-border supply) commands a share of 30% and mode 2 (consumption abroad) a share of 10%.
10Details on the construction of the productivity variable are provided in Appendix table A-1. We discuss the variable
CSTRI in more detail in Section 3.
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Figure 3: CSTRI and manufacturing productivity across institutional regimes: descriptive evidence
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presence in an importing country to contest the market. First, for a given level of trade restrictiveness implied
by policy, the institutional environment in a country may aﬀect entry decisions of potential foreign suppliers,
giving rise to a selection or ex-ante eﬀect of institutions.11 To illustrate this channel, consider a global
provider of telecommunication services, Vodafone. This ﬁrm has a direct presence in 21 ‘local’ markets, and
an indirect presence in 55 ‘partner’ markets.12 Of these 76 markets, 19 (25%) are in countries with relatively
low institutional quality (measured by the ‘control of corruption’ variable being less than the sample median)
while the other 57 (75%) are in countries with relatively high institutional quality (‘control of corruption’
above the sample median). If we consider the markets where Vodafone is not present, either directly or in
partnership with a local provider, 87 out of 142 (61%) are in countries with relatively low institutional quality
and 55 (38%) are in countries with relatively high institutional quality.13 Regression analysis suggests that
11Theoretical models of multinational ﬁrms decisions in an international framework with country level diﬀerences in contract
enforcement institutions are developed in Antra`s and Helpman (2004) and Grossman and Helpman (2005). Bernard et al. (2010)
ﬁnd that better governance in the destination countries is associated with a higher number of aﬃliates established by foreign
multinationals. However, such a relationship is not found to be robust in Blonigen and Piger (2014).
12Vodafone data have been collected by the authors from the oﬃcial Vodafone web page: http://www.vodafone.com/content/
index/about/about-us/where.html.
13A test of equality of means rejects the null hypothesis that the probability of Vodafone’s commercial presence is the same in
the two groups of countries with low and high institutional quality (106 countries each), in favour of the alternative hypothesis
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even after controlling for country size (level of GDP) and for the level of services trade restrictiveness in
telecommunications, institutional quality has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability
of Vodafone entering a market by establishing a direct or indirect commercial presence.14
Second, conditional on entry, the quality of the exporters’ output may depend on the institutional
environment of the country where demand is located and the service is performed. A number of recent
studies linking ﬁrm productivity with the institutional environment in which ﬁrms operate conﬁrm this
hypothesis.15
Our empirical analysis diﬀers from existing country-sector studies on the link between upstream restric-
tions and downstream manufacturing productivity in several respects. Papers such as Barone and Cingano
(2011) and Bourle`s et al. (2013) focus on OECD countries, a relatively homogenous group of mostly rich
economies. Our sample of countries spans 27 nations classiﬁed as ‘high income’ by the World Bank, 16 upper
middle income countries, 10 lower middle income countries and 4 low income economies. This allows to mean-
ingfully test for heterogeneous eﬀects across countries with very diﬀerent institutional capacity. Moreover,
both papers measure services restrictions using the OECD Product Market Regulation (PMR) indicator for
non-manufacturing industries. This variable has a strong focus on domestic policies and therefore does not
capture the important dimensions of services trade outlined above. Using the World Bank Services Trade
Restrictiveness index, Hoekman and Shepherd (forthcoming) focus only on developing countries. Their grav-
ity analysis of the eﬀect of services trade openness on manufacturing exports does not take into account
input-output linkages between services and manufacturing.
Our analysis complements van der Marel (2014b), who investigates whether countries with a high level of
regulatory capacity are better able to export in goods produced in industries that make relatively intensive
use of services. While van der Marel uses a world-average STRI for each service sector (as the sector-
level component of the country-sector interaction term representing ‘regulatory capacity’, in line with the
methodology proposed by Chor, 2010), we use country-level STRI measures to identify and quantify the
causal impact of services trade reforms on downstream productivity.
that such probability is higher in the group of countries with high institutional quality.
14Regression results are available from the authors on request.
15See for example Gaviria (2002), Dollar et al. (2005), Lensink and Meesters (2014) and Borghi et al. (forthcoming).
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3 Empirics
3.1 Empirical model and identiﬁcation strategy
The objective of our empirical analysis is to estimate the impact of service trade restrictiveness on productivity
in downstream manufacturing industries. We follow the approach pioneered by Rajan and Zingales (1998),
assuming that the eﬀect of upstream services trade policy on downstream productivity is a positive function
of the intensity of services use as intermediate inputs into downstream sectors. Therefore, our regressor
of interest is constructed by interacting a country-sector measure of trade restrictiveness in services with a
measure of services input use by downstream industries derived from input-output data. Formally, for any
country (i) and downstream manufacturing sector (j), we deﬁne a composite services trade restrictiveness
indicator (CSTRI) as follows:
CSTRIij = ∑
s
STRIis ×wijs (3.1)
where STRIis is the level of services trade restrictiveness for country i and services sector s and wijs is
a measure of input penetration of service s into manufacturing sector j of country i.16 We use for w the
shares of total intermediate consumption: wijs is the share associated to sector s in the total consumption
of intermediate inputs (both domestically produced and imported) of sector j in country i. Our baseline
productivity regression is then:
yij = α + βCSTRIij + γ′xij + δi + δj + ij (3.2)
where the dependent variable is a measure of productivity of downstream manufacturing sector j in country
i; δi and δj are respectively country and downstream sector individual eﬀects; and xij is the column vector
of relevant regressors varying at the country-sector level. In the baseline regressions, this vector contains
the variable Tariﬀ, the logarithm of the eﬀectively applied tariﬀ by country i in sector j. In subsequent
16The World Bank’s Services Trade Restrictiveness Index covers ﬁve services sectors – ﬁnancial services (banking and insur-
ance), telecommunications, retail distribution, transportation and professional services (accounting and legal) – and the most
relevant modes of supplying the respective service. These are commercial presence or FDI (mode 3) in every sub-sector; in
addition, cross-border supply (mode 1) of ﬁnancial, transportation and professional services; and the presence of service supply-
ing individuals (mode 4) in professional services. See Borchert et al. (2012) for a detailed description of the database. In our
empirical analysis, we alternatively use the STRI aggregated across all available modes or the mode 3 STRI. Since we consider
the role of importing countries’ institutions, the absence of information on mode 2 (consumption abroad) in the STRI data is
harmless.
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robustness checks, we add the variable T̃ariﬀ, the logarithm of the weighted average of tariﬀs eﬀectively
applied in manufacturing sectors k ≠ j (see Section 3.3 for a details on the construction of this variable).
Following the introductory discussion on the role of institutional variables in moderating the eﬀect of
services trade restrictiveness on downstream productivity, we allow for heterogeneous eﬀects of our regres-
sor of interest (CSTRI) across country-level institutional capacity. Accordingly, we propose the following
interaction model:
yij = α + βCSTRIij + κ(CSTRIij × ICi) + γ′xij + δi + δj + ij (3.3)
where ICi is a continuous proxy for institutional capacity in country i.
17 In this second speciﬁcation, the
impact of service trade restrictiveness is given by β+κICi and therefore varies at the country level depending
on the institutional framework.
The estimation sample includes 57 countries and 18 manufacturing sectors (listed in Appendix table
A-2). A description of the variables used in the estimations, including the data sources, is in Appendix table
A-1. Descriptive statistics are in Table 1.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable mean median sd min max
Productivity 11.76 11.72 1.36 7.23 16.26
CSTRI 4.35 3.61 2.92 0.00 22.62
IC 2.92 2.73 1.01 1.26 5.03
Tariﬀ 0.85 0.92 0.38 0.00 1.61
T̃ariﬀ 0.88 0.95 0.31 0.23 1.54
From estimation sample of column (8) of Table 8
IC = control of corruption
We now discuss several identiﬁcation issues which are common to our two speciﬁcations.
3.1.1 Omitted variables bias
Models (3.2) and (3.3) are estimated including country ﬁxed eﬀects and sector dummies. This neutralizes
the risk of estimation bias coming from omitted variables varying at the country or sectoral level. What
remains is the variability at the country-sector level. In particular we need to control for those variables that,
varying at the country-sector level, are potential determinants of productivity and that can be correlated
17We do not include the main eﬀect of ICi in equation (3.3) as it is accounted for by the country speciﬁc eﬀects.
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with services trade restrictiveness. The most relevant candidate is a measure of restrictiveness for trade in
goods (imports). Accordingly, we always include, as control, the tariﬀ variable(s) described above.
3.1.2 Endogeneity of the input penetration measure
The intensity of services consumption by a downstream manufacturing sector may be aﬀected by the degree of
services trade restrictiveness (less restricted services trade enhancing downstream intermediate consumption)
and the productivity in the manufacturing sector itself (more productive manufacturing sectors being able to
consume more diﬀerentiated services). In the ﬁrst case the number of manufacturing industries for which the
‘treatment’ (lower trade restrictiveness in the services sector) is likely to have more bite would be increasing
with the treatment itself. In the second case we would have an issue of reverse causality. Killing two birds
with one stone, we measure wijs of any country i with the input penetration of service s into industry j
for country c ≠ i. We follow here the assumption widely adopted in the literature originating from Rajan
and Zingales (1998), taking the United States’ input-output coeﬃcients as representative of the technological
relationships between industries. We therefore set c = US and remove the US from our sample.
3.1.3 Endogeneity of the services trade restrictiveness measure
Downstream productivity – or lack thereof – could aﬀect the degree of trade liberalization for upstream indus-
tries through lobbying, generating a problem of reverse causation. If low productivity industries downstream
are the ones lobbying for deeper upstream liberalization, our results would have to be interpreted – at worst
– as a lower bound for the impact of services trade openness on manufacturing productivity, conditional on
downstream lobbying (this argument is discussed in Bourle`s et al., 2013). To account for this and for the
more critical case where high productivity manufacturing industries are the ones with the right incentives
and capabilities to exert eﬀective lobbying pressure for services trade openness, we propose an instrument
for services trade restrictiveness.18 Section 3.2.1 discusses the construction of the instrument and the results
of IV regressions.
18The latter case is more critical because it would imply an upward bias in the estimated coeﬃcients.
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3.2 Results
The main estimation results for the baseline speciﬁcation (3.2) and the interaction model (3.3) are given in
Table 2. The ﬁrst two columns make use of the STRI measure aggregated across all modes of supply, while
the last two columns focus on measures relevant only for trade through commercial presence (Mode 3).
Table 2: Baseline and Interaction Model Estimation
All modes Mode 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CSTRI -0.025 0.065 -0.038* 0.052
(0.024) (0.038) (0.021) (0.032)
CSTRI × IC -0.041*** -0.039***
(0.014) (0.012)
Tariﬀ -0.120 -0.110 -0.323* -0.304
(0.084) (0.083) (0.186) (0.185)
Observations 912 912 912 912
R-squared 0.522 0.526 0.524 0.528
Robust (country-clustered) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Country ﬁxed eﬀects and sector dummies always included
IC = control of corruption
The estimated coeﬃcient of our composite measure of services trade restrictiveness has the expected
negative sign in the baseline speciﬁcation for both All modes in column (1) and Mode 3 in column (3): less
restrictive policy environments are associated with higher positive eﬀects on downstream manufacturing. In
the ﬁrst case, however, the estimate is not statistically diﬀerent from 0, while in the second case (mode 3)
it is only weakly statistically signiﬁcant (0.1 level). Moving to the interaction model, we ﬁnd a statistically
signiﬁcant, negative coeﬃcient for the interaction term. Lower services trade restrictiveness is associated
with a positive eﬀect on downstream manufacturing productivity, with the estimated eﬀect increasing the
greater is the country-level institutional capacity. The results of the interaction model suggest that the weak
or no signiﬁcance at the baseline speciﬁcation level is driven by a composition eﬀect. The role of institutions
based on the estimation of the Mode 3 case is further illustrated in Figure 4.19
For approximately 95% of our sample the eﬀect of CSTRI has the expected negative sign and, for
19The ﬁgure reports marginal eﬀects evaluated at 39 values of the control of corruption variable and 95% conﬁdence intervals.
The latter are calculated using the Delta method.
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Figure 4: Impact of use unit increase in CSTRI (Mode 3) on the downstream log productivity y
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approximately 60% of the observations (those with a level of control of corruption higher that 2.5), the eﬀect
is statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level. The positive eﬀect of lower trade restrictiveness in upstream
services sectors increases with institutional capacity. The eﬀect is not statistically diﬀerent from zero for low
levels of institutional capacity (approximately 40% of our sample).
To get a sense of the economic relevance of this result consider the following quantiﬁcation exercise.
We take four countries with similar mean values of the composite measure of services trade restrictiveness
CSTRI for Mode 3: Austria, Canada, Italy and Tanzania. These countries have very diﬀerent institutional
capacities or performance. Austria and Canada rank respectively 6th and 7th in terms of control of corruption
in our sample, while Italy ranks 25th and Tanzania 43rd. Assuming that the four economies adopt the less
restrictive services trade regime observed in the UK,20 productivity in downstream manufacturing increases
by 18.2% in Austria, 16.7% in Canada, 7.3% in Italy and only 3.9% in Tanzania.
The coeﬃcient on Tariﬀ is negative, although not statistically signiﬁcant, indicating that more protected
20Such a shift entails a reduction in the CSTRI by approximately 45% of a sample standard deviation for each of the 4
selected countries.
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sectors are also the least productive ones.21
3.2.1 Instrumenting for the services trade restrictiveness measure
As noted above, there are reasons one might be concerned with endogeneity of the STRI measures. In the
spirit of Arnold et al. (2011; forthcoming), we instrument for STRIi using the weighted average of STRI in
other countries c ≠ i:
STRIIVis ≡ ∑
c
STRIcs × SIci (3.4)
where the weights SIci are the similarity index in GDP per capita between i and c, with country c
belonging to a diﬀerent geographical region than i.22
The results are presented in Table 3. The instrument passes the standard tests. The results are, however,
quantitatively very similar to the baseline results of Table 2, suggesting we do not need to be concerned with
endogeneity of the services trade restrictiveness measure.
3.2.2 Random services trade restrictiveness
To ensure that our results can be given a clear economic interpretation, we perform a Placebo experiment
in which the ‘treatment’ (services trade restrictiveness), rather than being constructed from real data, is
randomly assigned. We construct the variable C̃STRIij = ∑s ŜTRIis × wijs, where ŜTRIis is a random
draw from a uniform distribution with support [0,100]. We then perform 100,000 regressions of model (3.3),
each with a diﬀerent, randomly constructed C̃STRIij , and we estimate the marginal eﬀects. As in the baseline
case, we evaluate the marginal eﬀects at 39 values of the control of corruption variable. The resulting dataset,
therefore, contains 3,900,000 estimated marginal eﬀects. Out of those, 84% are not statistically diﬀerent from
zero.
Figure 5 graphically represents the marginal eﬀects with the conﬁdence intervals – averaged across all the
100,000 regressions. It is apparent that the marginal eﬀects are never statistically diﬀerent from zero. Our
21We make no attempt to claim a causal link between tariﬀ protection and sectoral productivity, as this would be beyond
the scope of this paper.
22Following Helpman (1987), we deﬁne the similarity index in GDP per capita between i and c as SIic ≡ 1 −
{ pcGDPi
pcGDPi+pcGDPc
}2 − { pcGDPc
pcGDPi+pcGDPc
}2. The classiﬁcation of regions is the one of the World Bank. We thank Ben Shepherd
for suggesting using countries c from diﬀerent regions than i, rather than the same region as i.
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Table 3: Instrumental variable regressions
All modes Mode 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CSTRI -0.124* 0.028 -0.027 0.048
(0.072) (0.061) (0.052) (0.058)
CSTRI × IC -0.053*** -0.044***
(0.019) (0.017)
Tariﬀ -0.114 -0.103 -0.120 -0.109
(0.075) (0.073) (0.075) (0.073)
Observations 912 912 912 912
R-squared 0.515 0.523 0.522 0.526
First-stage F statistics
CSTRI 44.56 55.17 68.59 34.53
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CSTRI × IC 39.13 46.68
(p-value) 0.00 0.00
Underid SW Chi-sq statistics
CSTRI 45.58 219.92 70.15 145.24
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CSTRI × IC 186.81 244.07
(p-value) 0.00 0.00
Weak id SW F statistics
CSTRI 44.56 214.78 68.59 141.85
CSTRI × IC 182.44 238.36
Stock-Wright LM S statistics
Chi-sq 3.87 9.01 0.33 8.21
(p-value) 0.049 0.011 0.566 0.016
Robust (country-clustered) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Country ﬁxed eﬀects and sector dummies always included
“SW” refers to Sanderson and Windmeijer (forthcoming)
Instrument for CSTRIi: weighted average of CSTRIk (see Section 3.1.3)
IC = control of corruption
results, therefore, cannot be obtained with random services trade restrictiveness measures.23
3.3 Robustness checks
3.3.1 Diﬀerent moderator variables
As a robustness check we estimate the interaction model (3.3) with alternative institutional variables (M)
instead of control of corruption. Table 3.3.1 shows the results for two alternative measures of institutional
23The same results are obtained if the median is used instead of the average. Note that we do not exclude the United States
from the sample – although the results are the same when doing so. Conﬁdence intervals for each regression are computed using
the Delta method.
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Figure 5: Impact of use unit increase in CSTRI (Mode 3) on y: Random assignement of STRI
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capacity and for GDP per capita as a proxy for economic development. When M is deﬁned as an indicator
of the quality of institutions such as the rule of law or a measure of regulatory quality, the moderating eﬀect
remains unchanged. However, it is not statistically diﬀerent from zero if we use per capita GDP. The latter
ﬁnding suggests that it is not diﬀerences in average per capita incomes (wealth) that shape the impact of
services trade policies on downstream productivity, but that what matters are the institutional dimensions
of the business environment that prevails in a country.
3.3.2 Alternative input penetration measures
The services input penetration measure adopted in this paper is the ratio between the cost of services inputs
and the value of total intermediate consumption of downstream manufacturing industries. This measure
diﬀers from the deﬁnition of IO technical coeﬃcients, which represent the ratio between services inputs
and total output of a downstream sector24. Our deﬁnition does not embed diﬀerences in value added across
24The ratio between the cost of services inputs and the value of the downstream industry output is the proxy for direct
input penetration usually adopted in the empirical literature on the indirect eﬀect of services policies on manufacturing (see for
example Barone and Cingano, 2011).
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Table 4: Interaction Model Estimation with Alternative Moderator Variables
Moderator (M) Rule of Law Reg. Quality GDP per capita
All Modes Mode 3 All Modes Mode 3 All Modes Mode 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CSTRI -0.032 -0.039* -0.034 -0.040* -0.015 -0.027
(0.024) (0.021) (0.025) (0.021) (0.024) (0.020)
CSTRI ×M -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.044*** -0.045*** -0.000 -0.000
(0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000)
Tariﬀ -0.532* -1.498** -0.303 -1.252** -0.800** -1.826**
(0.287) (0.733) (0.184) (0.619) (0.399) (0.860)
Observations 912 912 912 912 912 912
R-squared 0.527 0.530 0.525 0.529 0.525 0.526
Robust (country-clustered) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Country ﬁxed eﬀects and sector dummies always included
manufacturing sectors, representing therefore a better proxy for technological diﬀerences in intermediate input
consumption. In order to test the robustness of our preferred measure of input penetration we replicate the
estimation using both US technical coeﬃcients and the coeﬃcients derived from the US Leontief inverse
matrix, which captures also the indirect linkages between upstream and downstream industries. Estimation
results are given in Table 5.
Table 5: Estimation with Technical and Leontief IO coeﬃcients
IO weights Technical Leontief
All modes Mode 3 All modes Mode 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CSTRI -0.068 0.131 -0.087** 0.111 -0.080 0.172 -0.103 0.176
(0.052) (0.081) (0.043) (0.075) (0.082) (0.133) (0.062) (0.144)
CSTRI × IC -0.093*** -0.085*** -0.116*** -0.119**
(0.027) (0.026) (0.042) (0.049)
Tariﬀ -0.122 -0.085 -0.330* -0.260 -0.126 -0.078 -0.344* -0.241
(0.084) (0.084) (0.186) (0.186) (0.085) (0.087) (0.187) (0.197)
Observations 912 912 912 912 912 912 912 912
R-squared 0.523 0.529 0.525 0.531 0.522 0.527 0.525 0.529
Robust (country-clustered) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Country ﬁxed eﬀects and sector dummies always included
IC = control of corruption
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The sign and statistical signiﬁcance of the estimated coeﬃcients is robust across all measures of input
penetration. Given the smaller size of technical and Leontief IO weights with respect to the shares of total
intermediate consumption, the higher coeﬃcient estimates in Table 5 generate economic eﬀects that are
similar in magnitude.
Given the heterogeneity of the countries in our sample, one can question the representativeness of the
US as the baseline country for the IO linkages. In Table 6 we present results using the services shares
of manufacturing intermediate consumption derived from China’s 2005 IO accounting matrix. China was
classiﬁed as lower middle income country by the World Bank25 in 2006 and therefore represents a more
representative baseline for our estimation sample which includes both middle and low income countries. The
sign and statistical signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient estimates are not aﬀected by the use of China’s data. The
higher values of the coeﬃcients using Chinese IO data suggests that the use of US data is a conservative
choice for the economic quantiﬁcation of the results.
Table 6: Estimation with Chinese input penetration measures
All modes Mode 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CSTRI -0.081 0.135 -0.099** 0.083
(0.050) (0.090) (0.043) (0.083)
CSTRI × IC -0.094*** -0.078**
(0.032) (0.030)
Tariﬀ -0.085 -0.084 -0.277 -0.270
(0.086) (0.084) (0.188) (0.187)
Observations 912 912 912 912
R-squared 0.526 0.529 0.528 0.531
Robust (country-clustered) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Country ﬁxed eﬀects and sector dummies always included
China excluded from the estimation sample
IC = control of corruption
Barone and Cingano (2011) argue that country-speciﬁc measures of input intensity carry an idiosyncratic
component which is likely to be related to the trade restrictiveness regime. In that case the sign of the
estimation bias would be ambiguous and a robustness check which does not rely on country-speciﬁc weights
25In 2006 China had a per capita GNI (Atlas method) of 2,050 US dollars. For that year the GNI per capita interval for
lower middle income countries was ﬁxed by the World Bank at 906-3,595 US dollars.
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is required (Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2006). We follow the approach adopted by Barone and Cingano (2011)
and instrument the US shares of services s in total intermediate consumption with
wIVjs ≡ δˆj + γˆjSTRIc¯s ∀s (3.5)
where δˆj and γˆj are estimates from the following sector s speciﬁc regression in which country c¯ has been
excluded from the sample26
wijs = δi + δj + γjSTRIis + ij ∀s (3.6)
The input intensity measures derived in (3.5) minimise by construction the idiosyncratic component present
in any country-speciﬁc proxy. Consistently with the literature, we chose country c¯ to be equal to the US.27
We also perform this IV exercise by setting c¯ equal to Sweden, the country with the lowest average STRI
values across services sectors (both for Mode 3 and for All modes) of the countries in the sample28 used for
equations (3.6). The results are presented in Table 7.
Although the statistical signiﬁcance of the estimated coeﬃcients is reduced (especially in the case where
c¯ is set equal to Sweden), their signs and magnitudes are in line with our baseline results.
3.3.3 Additional tariﬀ controls
Import protection for other manufacturing sectors k ≠ j should also matter – as shown, among others, by
Goldberg et al. (2010). To control for this, we augment model (3.3) with the variable T̃ariﬀ, constructed as:
T̃ariﬀ = ∑
k
τik ×wjk (3.7)
26This methodology was introduced by Ciccone and Papaioannou (2006) to instrument US industry capital growth. Our
estimates are obtained accounting for the fact that the dependent variable in (3.6) is fractional, applying the speciﬁcation
suggested in Papke and Wooldridge (1996).
27A rationale for this is that the US is one of the least regulated countries in a historical perspective (Barone and Cingano,
2011).
28Estimation of the models (3.6) requires country speciﬁc input intensity measures (wijs) and services trade restrictiveness
measures (STRIis). The sample size therefore is determined by the intersection of the country coverage of the OECD STAN
IO Database and that of the World Bank STR Database. This intersection includes 32 countries: Australia, Austria, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Lithuania, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, South Africa, Spain, Sweden,
Turkey, United Kingdom and United States. This limited intersection in the country coverage of the two databases does not
allow to perform a robustness check that makes use of the shares of intermediate consumption speciﬁc to each country (the
baseline estimation sample counts 57 countries plus the US). In any event, the endogeneity issues associated with country-speciﬁc
input intensity measures would have made this particular robustness check quite problematic (see Section 3.1.2).
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Table 7: Non country-speciﬁc input penetration: IV regressions
Country c¯ United States Sweden
All modes Mode 3 All modes Mode 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CSTRI -0.053## 0.013 -0.051## 0.019 -0.050# 0.001 -0.044# 0.008
(0.035) (0.054) (0.032) (0.049) (0.035) (0.055) (0.031) (0.048)
CSTRI × IC -0.030# -0.030### -0.024 -0.023#
(0.021) (0.018) (0.022) (0.018)
Tariﬀ -0.088 -0.081 -0.089 -0.082 -0.088 -0.082 -0.089 -0.084
(0.074) (0.073) (0.074) (0.073) (0.074) (0.073) (0.074) (0.073)
Observations 930 930 930 930 930 930 930 930
R-squared 0.526 0.529 0.527 0.531 0.526 0.529 0.528 0.531
First-stage F
CSTRI 460.67 251.95 367.65 222.42 341.13 181.57 303.24 177.45
(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CSTRI × IC 303.94 243.94 186.83 189.05
(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Underid SW Chi-sq
CSTRI 470.93 253.35 375.84 194.00 348.73 177.88 309.99 171.21
(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CSTRI × IC 346.70 279.28 191.29 217.86
(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak id SW F
CSTRI 460.67 247.54 367.65 189.55 341.13 173.80 303.24 167.28
CSTRI × IC 338.75 272.87 186.90 212.86
Stock-Wright LM S
Chi-sq 2.50 4.77 2.68 5.40 2.14 3.33 2.14 3.96
(p-value) 0.114 0.092 0.102 0.067 0.143 0.190 0.143 0.138
Robust (country-clustered) standard errors in parentheses
# p<0.20, ## p<0.15, ### p<0.11, * p<0.10
Country ﬁxed eﬀects and sector dummies always included
US not excluded from the estimation sample
Instrument for CSTRIij : ∑s STRIis ×wIVjs (see Section 3.3.2)
IC = control of corruption
where τik is the log of eﬀectively applied tariﬀs by country i in manufacturing sector k ≠ j and the
weights wijk are the input penetration coeﬃcients of k in j from the US IO table.
The results are in Table 8. The variable T̃ariﬀ has always the expected negative sign (higher tariﬀs
in upstream manufacturing sectors reduce productivity in downstream manufacturing) and it is statistically
signiﬁcant when the variable Tariﬀ is excluded from the estimations (columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6)). Most
importantly, the coeﬃcients on the interaction term between CSTRI and the institutional capacity variable
(control of corruption) are the same as in the corresponding baseline regressions of Table 2.
18
Cosimo Beverelli, Matteo Fiorini and Bernard Hoekman
Table 8: Estimation with tariﬀs in other manufacturing sectors
All modes Mode 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CSTRI -0.024 0.063* -0.024 0.063 -0.038* 0.053 -0.038* 0.052
(0.024) (0.038) (0.024) (0.038) (0.021) (0.032) (0.021) (0.032)
CSTRI × IC -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.039*** -0.039***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012)
Tariﬀ 0.002 0.013 -0.220 -0.204
(0.139) (0.140) (0.371) (0.377)
T̃ariﬀ -0.246* -0.232* -0.248 -0.252 -0.565* -0.534* -0.223 -0.217
(0.136) (0.133) (0.216) (0.214) (0.297) (0.289) (0.599) (0.601)
Observations 912 912 912 912 912 912 912 912
R-squared 0.523 0.526 0.523 0.526 0.524 0.528 0.524 0.528
Robust (country-clustered) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Country ﬁxed eﬀects and sector dummies always included
IC = control of corruption
3.3.4 Variations in country and industry coverage
The baseline and interaction models were re-estimated excluding each of the 57 countries in the estimation
sample at a time. Results are extremely robust in terms of magnitude (variations smaller than 20%) and
statistical signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients. Results remain quite robust when dropping each of the 18 manufac-
turing sectors at a time: the signs of the key coeﬃcients are unchanged, although in a few cases the coeﬃcient
of the interaction term varies more than 20% (never more than 50%). Results of these 300 regressions (57
plus 18 for Mode 3 and All modes, both with the baseline speciﬁcation and the speciﬁcation with interaction)
are available upon request.
4 Theory
In this section we propose a theoretical framework that provides some insights into the empirical ﬁnding that
institutional capacity is an important moderator variable for the positive eﬀect of services trade openness
on productivity in downstream industries. The framework proposes two diﬀerent channels through which
institutions can have an impact. The ﬁrst channel centers on the trade decision (ex ante). The second
channel operates conditional on engaging in exports. A key feature of the framework is to recognize that
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the proximity burden means that foreign suppliers must perform some part of the service in the destination
(importing) country. As a result, the institutional environment in the destination country is a determinant
of an exporter’s payoﬀ. If institutions are not perfectly observable for ﬁrms that are located abroad, the
ability to identify countries with higher quality institutions will be one parameter diﬀerentiating ﬁrms: only
the best ﬁrms, those providing higher quality services, will have the capacity to detect the best countries.
Countries with high quality institutions will attract foreign ﬁrms that provide on average better services
than foreign ﬁrms in countries with weaker institutions. As a consequence, the downstream industries in
countries with high institutional capacity will beneﬁt more from services trade openness. This ‘selection
eﬀect’ is complemented by a second channel which is active given an export decision (ex post). Both the
exporters’ payoﬀ and the quality of their services performance is sensitive to the institutional environment
in which they have decided to operate. Thus, for any level of exporters’ productivity, the average quality of
foreign services performance in an institutionally weak environment will be less than in countries with robust
institutions.
4.1 The setup
The economy consists of two countries indexed by i ∈ {1,2}. The two countries have an identical economic
structure while they diﬀer in terms of institutional setting, which we deﬁne as the capacity of a country to
minimise the exposure of the economic agents active within its territory to harmful unexpected changes in the
operating environment. This deﬁnition captures the diﬀerent dimensions of institutional capacity explored
in our empirical exercise: from control of corruption, to rule of law, to regulatory quality.29 Each country is
characterised by an industry Y using intermediate input x. We take a reduced form approach assuming that
the average productivity y in the downstream industry of country i is a function of the average quality q of
the intermediate input x available in the country. Formally,
yi = f(qi) ∀i (4.1)
29Examples include unexpected corruption episodes, restrictions on key complementary investments or movement of personnel,
sudden changes in the authorizing regulatory framework.
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with f strictly positive, increasing and concave and qi ∈ [0,1] ∀i. We assume that each country has a
minimum-quality domestic supply of x, such that, if the countries are closed to international transactions in
x the productivity of the downstream sector is yi = f(0) ∀i.
The international supply of x consists of a continuum of heterogeneous exporters located outside the two-
country system described above and indexed by ϕ, which corresponds to a productivity parameter varying
on the support [0,1] such that exporter ϕ = 0 has a minimum productivity while exporter ϕ = 1 is the most
productive. Exporters have to choose where to export x among the potential destination countries. Once
the destination country is chosen, trade takes place. However, because of the promity burden, this often will
involve a stage in which the foreign ﬁrm must undertake activities in the territory of the selected destination
country. To capture this, we introduce an intangibility parameter τ ∈ [0,1] that determines the relative
importance of this ‘performance stage’. This allows x to range from being fully tangible (all production occurs
in the exporting country) to fully intangible (all activities must be performed in the importing nation). If it
is fully tangible the product is called a ‘good’. In all other cases it is a ‘service’. In the latter case, during
the stage of services performance in the importing country i, the foreign ﬁrm confronts unexpected shocks
in the operating environment that follow a homogeneous Poisson process with rate parameter θi. For each
unexpected event the foreign ﬁrm incurs a unitary cost which does not vary across destination countries. The
expected payoﬀ of exporting the intermediate service input x with intangibility τ to country i is given by:
E[πi(ϕ)] = g(ϕ) − θiτ (4.2)
with g positive, increasing and concave. In order to restrict the analysis to exporters - i.e. to ﬁrms that get
non negative payoﬀs by exporting - we assume that g(0) > 1. θ captures the institutional setting in country
i with high values of θ being associated with fragile institutions. For simplicity we restrict30 the support
of θ to the interval (0,1]. Similarly, we assume that the quality of exporters’ output depends positively on
their productivity and negatively on the θ parameter of the selected destination country in instances where
x possesses some degree of intangibility: unexpected negative events not only aﬀect exporters’ payoﬀs but
30This restriction makes the number of unexpected shocks a fraction instead of an integer without modifying the economic
meaning of the payoﬀ function.
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also the quality of their output x. Formally,
E[qi(ϕ)] = k(ϕ) − θiτ (4.3)
with k positive, increasing and concave. We assume that k(0) > 1 to focus on foreign ﬁrms that produce
higher quality than domestically supplied intermediate inputs. This assumption reﬂects the usual new trade
theory implication that exporting ﬁrms have superior properties than non-exporting ones. This framework
makes the exporter’s payoﬀ as well as the quality of the exported output a function of the institutional quality
of the selected destination country in all cases where a product has some degree of intangibility.31
Finally, we assume that the institutional capacity of potential destination countries is not perfectly
observable and that the productivity ϕ determines the precision with which an exporter can estimate the
true value of θ. For each potential destination country i, exporters observe a signal ϑi instead of θi. The
signals are independently distributed according to non-standard uniform probability density functions:
ϑi ∼ U[q1(θi, ϕ), q2(θi, ϕ)] ∀i (4.4)
where q1 = θiϕ and q2 = (θi −1)ϕ+1. This speciﬁcation implies that an exporter with maximum productivity
(ϕ = 1) observes - for each potential destination country - a signal which is equal to the true institutional
capacity with probability 1. In contrast, the signal observed by an exporter with 0 productivity can take any
value in the support of the institutional capacity parameter with equal probability. In between those two
extrema, the size of the interval upon which the signal is uniformly distributed is a decreasing function of
the exporter’s productivity type.32
31The type of activity associated with intangibility, mode 3 / FDI, also is used to produce tangible items (goods). A similar
framework may well apply to FDI more generally but the mechanism modelled here is qualitatively diﬀerent because ﬁrms
producing goods have a choice between exporting and FDI. In the services context the proximity burden requires FDI and
/ or mode 4 cross-border movement, whereas in the case of goods the export versus FDI decision will take into account the
institutional environment and result in more exports relative to FDI than what would be optimal absent the institutional factors.
In the case of services it is not feasible to produce in the exporting country and thus the process of performing a service is more
sensitive to the institutional environment in the importing country.
32A more parsimonious speciﬁcation for an equivalent signalling technology is given by q1 and q2 satisfying the following
properties: q1 ∶ (0,1] × [0,1] → [0, θi] with q1(θi,0) = 0, q1(θi,1) = θi, ∂q1/∂θi ≥ 0, ∂q1/∂ϕ ≥ 0 and q2 ∶ (0,1] × [0,1] → [θi, θ¯]
with q2(θi,0) = 1, q2(θi,1) = θi, ∂q2/∂θi ≤ 0, ∂q2/∂ϕ ≤ 0.
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4.2 Closed and open regimes: the role of institutions
We can now study - under two diﬀerent institutional environments - the eﬀect of upstream trade openness
on downstream productivity. We assume without loss of generality that country 1 has a higher institutional
capacity than country 2, i.e. θ1 < θ2. We denote with δ the diﬀerence θ2 − θ1. If the two countries are closed
to international transactions in x the productivity of the downstream sector is yi = f(0) ∀i. We consider
now the case where the two countries open their economies, creating a pool of potential destinations for
international exporters. Given ϕ and τ , each exporter has to decide its destination country based on the
realization of the signals ϑ1 and ϑ2. If x is fully tangible (τ = 0), institutional capacities do not aﬀect by
construction the payoﬀs and the exporters choose each country with equal probability. If instead τ > 0, an
exporter with productivity ϕ chooses country 1 if and only if:33
g(ϕ) − ϑ1τ ≥ g(ϕ) − ϑ2τ ⇐⇒ ϑ1 ≤ ϑ2 (4.5)
Denote with Π(i∣ϕ, δ) or simply Π(i) the probability of choosing country i given productivity ϕ and institu-
tional diﬀerence δ. The properties of the probabilistic structure embedded in the exporters’ decision problem
are given in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 If x possesses some degree of intangibility (τ > 0),
(i) ∀δ > 0 and ϕ > 0, Π(1) > Π(2). If ϕ = 0, then Π(1) = Π(2);
(ii) the probability of choosing the best (worst) country is a non-decreasing (non-increasing) function of both
the exporters’ productivity ϕ and the diﬀerence in institutional capacity δ.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Lemma 1 point (i) states that, if the two countries are not identical, at any non-zero level of productivity
the probability of choosing the best country is higher than the probability of choosing the worst country.
Moreover, Lemma 1, point (ii) formally restates the selection mechanism of our framework: better exporters
gets more precise signals about the institutional capacity of potential destination countries and therefore
33Having a weak inequality in the choice condition reﬂects our implicit assumption that, when the exporter receives two
identical signals, it is ‘lucky’ and chooses the best country.
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choose to export to the best country with a higher probability. Furthermore, given our speciﬁcation, the
institutional diﬀerence between the two countries positively aﬀects the precision of the signal at any level of
productivity. The probabilistic structure described in Lemma 1 determines the expected average quality of
the intermediate input available in each country, which corresponds to the weighted average of the output’s
expected quality across exporters, with weights given by the probability of exporting to country i. Formally,
qi = ∫
1
0
E[qi(ϕ)] ×Π(i)dϕ (4.6)
An immediate corollary of Lemma 1 is given by the following
Corollary 1 If x possesses some degree of intangibility (τ > 0), then y1 > y2 > f(0).
Proof. See Appendix B.
Openness to trade in the non-fully-tangible intermediate input x increases downstream productivity
above its closed economy benchmark everywhere. This eﬀect is higher in the country with a better insti-
tutional framework. When comparing the weighted average of the expected quality qi of output in the two
countries, we can identify the two impact channels discussed at the beginning of this section. The diﬀerence
between the probability of choosing the best country and the probability of choosing the worst, reﬂects the
ex-ante impact channel of institutional capacity. This diﬀerence is a function of exporters productivity. The
diﬀerence between E[q1(ϕ)] and E[q2(ϕ)] is constant for any given level of productivity and reﬂects the
ex-post impact channel of institutions.
5 Conclusions
This paper contributes to the literature investigating the eﬀects of services trade policy, focusing on the
indirect impacts of policy on the productivity of downstream industries in a large and heterogeneous sample
of countries. The large number of countries in our cross-section allows for an empirical test of the role
of institutions in shaping this eﬀect. Due to the speciﬁcities of services and services trade, reducing the
restrictiveness of services trade policy may not be a suﬃcient condition for the expected positive eﬀect
of liberalised service trade on downstream industries. Using an empirical model that identiﬁes the causal
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link between services liberalisation and downstream manufacturing, this paper shows that this conjecture
is conﬁrmed by the data. Our estimates imply that the same reduction in services trade restrictiveness
would increase manufacturing productivity by 16.7% in Canada as compared to only 3.9% in Tanzania.
Analogous diﬀerences hold for countries at equivalent stages of economic development and with similar per
capita incomes, like Austria and Italy.
A reduced form theoretical framework that draws from the literature on institutions rationalises these
empirical results. This framework takes into account the speciﬁc characteristics of services and services
trade that imply that exporting services ﬁrms must to a greater or lesser extent engage in economic activity
within importing countries. When international services transactions are liberalised, cross-country diﬀerences
in institutional capacity generates both a selection eﬀect at the level of the decision whether to engage in
trade, and a performance eﬀect that operates once trade decisions have been taken. The interaction of the
two factors allows manufacturing ﬁrms in countries with good institutions to source higher quality services
inputs. Our empirical exercise captures both of these eﬀects. An empirical quantiﬁcation of the two eﬀects
requires ﬁrm-level data for a broad cross-section of countries and is left for future research.
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Appendices
A Appendix tables
Table A-1: Variables list
Variable Description Data source
Productivityij Log of Labor productivity (output per worker) UNIDO INDSTAT4, Rev. 3
in manufacturing sector j in country i
STRIis Trade Restrictiveness Index in service World Bank’s Services Trade
sector s in country i Restrictions Database
wijs Input penetration of service s into OECD I-O Tables (mid-2000)
manufacturing sector j of country i
ICi Control of corruption, rule of law, regulatory quality World Bank’s Worldwide
in country i Governance Indicators
GDP per capitai GDP per capita (current US$) World Bank’s World
in country i Development Indicators
Tariﬀ Log of eﬀectively applied tariﬀ UNCTAD TRAINS
in manufacturing sector j in country i
T̃ariﬀ Log of weighted average of eﬀectively applied tariﬀs UNCTAD TRAINS
in manufacturing sectors k ≠ j in country i and OECD I-O Table
(weights = input penetration of k into j) of the US (mid-2000)
30
Cosimo Beverelli, Matteo Fiorini and Bernard Hoekman
Table A-2: List of countries and sectors in the estimations
Country Sector
Albania Kyrgyz Rep. 15-16
Austria Lebanese Rep. 17-19
Belgium Lithuania 20
Botswana Malawi 21-22
Brazil Malaysia 23
Bulgaria Mauritius 24
Burundi Mongolia 25
Canada Morocco 26
Chile Netherlands 27
China New Zealand 28
Colombia Oman 29
Czech Republic Peru 30
Denmark Poland 31
Ecuador Portugal 32
Ethiopia Qatar 33
Finland Romania 34
France Saudi Arabia 35
Georgia South Africa 36-37
Germany Spain
Greece Sri Lanka
Hungary Sweden
India Tanzania
Indonesia Turkey
Ireland Ukraine
Italy United Kingdom
Japan Uruguay
Jordan Viet Nam
Korea, Rep. Yemen
Kuwait
Sectors are ISIC Rev. 2 manufacturing industries
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B Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. We assume WLOG that θ1 < θ2. The probability of choosing the best country Π(1) is
given by:
Π(1) = Pr(ϑ1 ≤ ϑ2) = Pr(ϑ1 − ϑ2 ≤ 0) = FZ(0) (B-1)
where Z is the random variable function of the two signals, Z ≡ ϑ1 −ϑ2, and FZ is its cumulative distribution
function. In order to derive the analytical expression for FZ(0) we need to integrate the joint distribution
of the two independent random variables ϑ1 and ϑ2 over the area in the joint support on the (ϑ1, ϑ2)-plane
where ϑ2 ≥ ϑ1. The joint pdf p(⋅, ⋅) of two independent random variables is the product of their distributions,
therefore:
p(ϑ1, ϑ2) = 1
q2(θ1, ϕ) − q1(θ1, ϕ) ×
1
q2(θ2, ϕ) − q1(θ2, ϕ) (B-2)
and, given our speciﬁcation of the functions q1(θi, ϕ) and q2(θi, ϕ):
p(ϑ1, ϑ2) = 1(1 −ϕ)2 (B-3)
Notice that the condition θ1 < θ2 plus our speciﬁcation of q1(θi, ϕ) and q2(θi, ϕ) imply the following two
inequalities:
q1(θ1, ϕ) = θ1ϕ < θ2ϕ = q1(θ2, ϕ) ∀ϕ > 0 (B-4)
q2(θ1, ϕ) = (θ1 − 1)ϕ + 1 < (θ2 − 1)ϕ + 1 = q2(θ2, ϕ) ∀ϕ > 0 (B-5)
that become identities for ϕ = 0. (B-4) and (B-5) imply that the two points (q1(θ1, ϕ), q1(θ2, ϕ)) and
(q2(θ1, ϕ), q2(θ2, ϕ)) lie always above the 45 degree line in the (ϑ1, ϑ2)-plane. In order to identify the area
in the joint support of ϑ2 and ϑ1 where ϑ2 ≥ ϑ1 we just have to distinguish the following two cases:
1. if q2(θ1, ϕ) > q1(θ2, ϕ) which, given our speciﬁcations is equivalent to the condition ϕ < 1/(1 + δ), the
area where the joint pdf has to be integrated is given in Figure B-1;
2. if instead q2(θ1, ϕ) ≤ q1(θ2, ϕ), which means ϕ ≥ 1/(1 + δ), we have that the area where the joint pdf
has to be integrated is given in Figure B-2.
We have now all the ingredients to write the following expression for FZ(0):
FZ(0) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
∫ q1(θ2,ϕ)q1(θ1,ϕ) ∫ q2(θ2,ϕ)q1(θ2,ϕ) p(ϑ1, ϑ2)dϑ2dϑ1 + ∫ q2(θ1,ϕ)q1(θ2,ϕ) ∫ q2(θ2,ϕ)ϑ1 p(ϑ1, ϑ2)dϑ2dϑ1 if 0 ≤ ϕ < 11+δ
∫ q2(θ2,ϕ)q1(θ1,ϕ) ∫ q2(θ2,ϕ)q1(θ2,ϕ) p(ϑ1, ϑ2)dϑ2dϑ1 if 11+δ ≤ ϕ ≤ 1
(B-6)
Plugging the expressions for the joint distribution p(ϑ1, ϑ2), for q1(θ2, ϕ), for q2(θ2, ϕ) and rearranging we
get:
Π(1) = FZ(0) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1
2
+ δϕ
1−ϕ
[1 − 1
2
δϕ
1−ϕ
] if 0 ≤ ϕ < 1
1+δ
1 if 1
1+δ
≤ ϕ ≤ 1 (B-7)
The probability of choosing country 2 is then:
Π(2) = 1 − FZ(0) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1
2
[ϕ(1+δ)−1
(1−ϕ)2
]2 if 0 ≤ ϕ < 1
1+δ
0 if 1
1+δ
≤ ϕ ≤ 1 (B-8)
Point (i) and (ii) easily follow from the study of Π(1) and Π(2).
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Proof of Corollary 1. if τ > 0, by construction we have that E[q1(ϕ)] > E[q2(ϕ)] > 0 ∀ϕ > 0 and
E[q1(ϕ)] = E[q2(ϕ)] > 0 for ϕ = 0. Moreover, from point (ii) of Lemma 1 we know that Π(1) > Π(2) ∀ϕ > 0
and Π(1) = Π(2) for ϕ = 0. Finally, again from Lemma 1 we know that there are many values of ϕ and δ for
which both Π(1) and Π(2) are strictly positive. It follows that:
q1 = ∫
1
0
E[q1(ϕ)] ×Π(1)dϕ > ∫
1
0
E[q2(ϕ)] ×Π(2)dϕ = q2 > 0 (B-9)
The result follows by construction given that yi = f(qi) with f strictly positive and increasing.
Figure B-1: area in the joint support where ϑ2 ≥ ϑ1 (case 1)
ϑ10
ϑ2
q1(θ1, ϕ) q2(θ1, ϕ)
ϑ1 = q1(θ2, ϕ)
q1(θ2, ϕ)
q2(θ2, ϕ)
ϑ2 = ϑ1
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Figure B-2: area in the joint support where ϑ2 ≥ ϑ1 (case 2)
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